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Abstract—In this paper we combine formal modeling and
analysis of infrastructures of organisations with sociological
explanation to provide a framework for insider threat analysis.
We use the Higher Order Logic proof assistant Isabelle/HOL to
support this framework. In the formal model, we exhibit and use
a common trick from the formal verification of security protocols
showing that it is applicable to insider threats. We introduce
briefly a three step process of social explanation illustrating that
it can be applied fruitfully to the characterisation of insider
threats. We introduce the Insider theory constructed in Isabelle
that implements this process of social explanation. To validate
that the social explanation is generally useful for the analysis
of insider threats and to demonstrate our framework, we model
and verify the insider threat patterns Entitled Independent and
Ambitious Leader in our Isabelle/HOL framework.
Index Terms—Insider threats, formal modeling, automated
verification
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we show that formal modeling techniques and
logic can be applied to model and analyse insider threats. The
main target of the verification is to scrutinize abstract models
of cyber-humane systems, i.e., systems that integrate organisa-
tions, policies, and actors. We ground our methodology on two
pillars: the process of sociological explanation originating in
the work of the sociologist Max Weber [1], and formal meth-
ods from computer science. For the practical support, we use
verification tools common in safety assurance of technical sys-
tems or security proofs of authentication protocols. Drawing
from the experience with the latter application, we show that
the classical attack on the Needham-Schroeder asymmetric
authentication protocol can be seen as an early insider attack
[2]. The central part for the analysis of this protocol shows
that insider threats are linked with personality splits of actors.
This decisive cue can be extracted and applied to insider threat
analysis within Weber’s social explanation. Max Weber uses
three steps from the macro-level to the micro-level and back
to explain sociological phenomena. Following this process of
social explanation, we provide a model integrating the context
of an organisation with actors, the policies that apply to actors
and locations and the psychological disposition of the actors.
We illustrate that the three steps of sociological explanation
can be applied to insider threat cases using Isabelle/HOL
[3]. This interactive theorem prover has been successfully
applied to security protocol analysis. We use it to provide a
mechanized logical framework for insider threat analysis and
illustrate its use on two patterns of insider attacks: the Entitled
Independent and the Ambitious Leader [4]. In comparison to
earlier work on insider threat analysis with modelcheckers [2],
[5], the current approach allows the integration of macro and
micro-level views in one complex model: the views of an
organisation as a graph of locations and actors where policies
are locally attached but also globally evaluated and where
actors have psychological dispositions. It is the expressiveness
of Higher Order Logic in Isabelle/HOL that enables such
complex models and proofs of security properties. The frame-
work we provide as an extension of the generic interactive
theorem prover Isabelle/HOL provides a tool to analyse insider
threats on infrastructure models including humans using social
explanation. In practice, such a tool can be used to model
and analyse infrastructures of organisation and their policies
to detect vulnerabilities to insider attacks in order to provide
new security architectures or to improve existing ones.
A. Overview
In Section II, we present the first insider as the intruder
of the Needham-Schroeder attack elaborating that it is the
switch of the intruder’s personality that enables the attack. We
next present a brief summary of social explanation following
Max Weber (Section III) illustrating its application to model
insider threats on the Dropbox example. The example has
been used in various works [6] including our own [2], [7].
Here we aim at generalizing the observation that Weber’s three
steps are a good model for insider threats. Drawing from the
CERT Guide to Insider Threats [4], we briefly introduce the
patterns of Insider Threats as identified by the CERT Insider
Threat Center at CMU: theft, sabotage, and fraud. In this
paper we focus on theft picking the two general patterns of
insider attacks on intellectual property defined as the major
insider patterns for theft [4]: the Entitled Independent and the
Ambitious Leader. We extend here the Isabelle/HOL model
for social explanation of insider threats [7] to a more general
framework and illustrate it on these general insider patterns in
Section IV validating the application by properties of insider
threats that can now readily be proved in Isabelle/HOL in
our model. The personality split discovered in the Needham
Schroeder protocol provides the means to formally prove that
the CERT attacks are possible in vulnerable infrastructures.
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II. THE FIRST INSIDER: NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER’S
INTRUDER
The attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol
has often been used as an example to show the superiority of
formal techniques over good engineering practice. The attack
is a result of a change of security assumptions about the
communication context. Needham and Schroeder designed this
protocol as one of the first cryptographic protocols a few
years after the invention of public key cryptography. This
was the time when the first email systems were installed, and
the Internet was still in its infancy. It was safe to assume
that the principals that participated in network communication
protocols were part of some group of honest people who
did not act as attackers simultaneously. Therefore, it is un-
derstandable that even in 1990 when the BAN logic [8] was
conceived and logical analysis was for the first time applied to
security protocols, the flaw in the Needham-Schroeder Public
Key protocol (NSPK) still was not discovered. It was only
five years later, in a world that already saw the advent of
the Internet as a public and anonymous communication space,
that Lowe identified a seemingly obvious but crucial attack on
NSPK. The attack does not need to break any cryptography
and still allows the attacker to impersonate a member of the
network. This attack is at the same time the first insider attack
since it is based on the fact that a seemingly trustworthy
participant of the group of principals acts simultaneously as
attacker. To the best of our knowledge, this basic fact about
the attack has been overlooked till now. Usually the attack
is characterized as a classical man-in-the-middle attack –
which is only half-true. We first briefly recapitulate the NSPK
protocol and its attack to show that it is an insider attack.
Moreover, we use the attack to illustrate that a refinement on
the data can be used to make the attack discoverable and that
this remedy also secures the protocol.
We use the short form of the Needham Schroeder Public
Key Protocol (NSPK) originally published by [9]. The protocol
is usually written as follows using public keys KA,KB known
globally and their secret counterparts K−1A ,K
−1
B establishing
nonces NA, NB in the process of authentication.
A→ B : {NA, A}KB
B → A : {NA, NB}KA
A→ B : {NB}KB
The originally published protocol gives rise to the well-
known attack of [10].
The attack goes as follows. The insider I is a normal
member of the network. Therefore, he has like any A and
B also an address and his public key KI – for which only
he has the corresponding private key K−1I – is known in the
communication network. What is more is that I is a peer, i.e.,
principals do actually communicate with I . This fact is the
main clue for the attack and also the reason why this is an
insider attack. I must wait for A to request a communication
with I , i.e., A sends a message according to step one of the
protocol to I . Now, I sets up a parallel session, pretends to
be A towards B initiating a second “Step One” this time from
I(A) to B, i.e., from I using B’s sender address. We show the
attack next using these notations but numbering the protocol
steps according as α.i and β.i for i ∈ {1..3} for each of the
parallel sessions.
α.1 A→ I : {NA, A}KI
β.1 I(A)→ B : {NA, A}KB
β.2 B → I(A) : {NA, NB}KA
α.2 I → A : {NA, NB}KA
α.3 A→ I : {NB}KI
β.3 I(A)→ B : {NB}KB
Looking at the steps, we can see that I switches between the
roles of I and I(A) at his leisure. The attack appears to be
some kind of man-in-the-middle attack but it is really only
successful as such towards B. While A quite rightly believes
that he speaks with I – as he intended to – B believes he
speaks to A while he really speaks with I .1 The NSPK attack
is easily fixed by introducing the sender B in step 2.
A→ B : {NA, A}KB
B → A : {NA, NB , B}KA
A→ B : {NB}KB
This fix of the attack has been also discovered by Lowe
who found the attack in the first place a year later using
modelchecking with CSP/FDR [11].
As discussed, the attack is an insider attack since it only
works if A addresses I as a legal member of the network. The
switch between the two roles I and I(A) could be considered
as acting schizophrenically if it would not be intentional
directed to the purpose of impersonation. The fact that this
switch is possible is another necessary and sufficient condition
for the success. Translated into practical terms, the notion of
I(A) could be implemented by IP packets with a fake sender
IP address (which is perfectly possible in the Internet protocol
IP and is also known as spoofing).
It is this split of personality that makes the attacker an
insider and simultaneously it is this split as well that enables
the attack. Based on this observation, we construct a generic
insiderness property called UasI in Section IV-D
III. SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: MAX WEBER’S
THREE STEPS
All sciences seek to find truth. The philosopher Popper
describes that it is ‘imperative to see and solve the most urgent
problems and to solve them by creating true theories’ [12].
Theories cannot correspond one-to-one to reality. They need
to abstract from reality. Therefore, the creation of true theories
according to Popper’s words can only be an approximation of
reality because any theory differs from the reality in which
the phenomena it describes exist. But any useful theory should
be consistent with the reality it describes and contain enough
detail to explain the phenomena that we are interested in.
1Even though the attack seems only half way successful, it can be exploited.
Assume B is a bank and I sends a message “transfer 1000 $ from my account
to that of I” after the attack using A’s credentials.
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Fig. 1. The ‘Grundmodell’ of sociological explanation [15]
Tarski’s conception of correspondence of theories explains
exactly this [13], [14]. This conception laid the foundation to
model theory for mathematical logic and is equally seen as
philosophical foundation in sociology in the school of critical
rationalism [15]).
Max Weber is one of the leading figures in the early
development of sociology. According to him the basic pro-
cess of sociology is ‘understanding explanation’ (Verstehendes
Erkla¨ren) [16]. This process of sociological explanation has
three steps: (a) the ’interpreting understanding’ (Deutendes
Verstehen), where the sociologists needs to understand how the
actors interpret their situation, (b) the subjectively meaningful
action of the actor, and (c) the effects of the action (see Figure
1).
The three steps of Max Weber have a level of interpretation
that is not known in other sciences (Boudon [17]). Alfred
Schu¨tz has taken this observation further [18] by coining
the notion of constructions of first order for the subjective
ideas of the actors that determine step (a) of the sociological
explanation while he described the models explaining the steps
of action (b) and effects (c) as second order constructions.
The aspect of interpretation of the process of sociological
explanation seems to require unusual logics of explanation.
Nevertheless, Weber, Boudon, as well as Schu¨tz have empha-
sized that the subjectivity of the social has to be treated with
the same objective methods of other sciences [15].
The explanation of sociological phenomena uses a three
layered approach following the logic of explanation [19] that
corresponds to Weber’s three steps. This approach refines the
three steps as described in Figure 1 by introducing a view on
actors. The explicit modeling of humans as actors gives rise
to distinguish a macro-level view from a micro-level view.
The three steps of Weber’s model together form a macro-
micro-macro-transition explaining sociological phenomena by
breaking down the global facts from the macro level (a) onto a
more refined local view of individual actors at the micro-level
(b). Finally those micro-steps are generalized and lifted back
onto the macro-level (c) to explain the global phenomenon.
The formal description of this procedure is described by
three transitions between dedicated logics. In the first step, a
situational logic maps the global context (environment) onto
the actor ((a) from the macro to the micro).
The second step in the micro-level of the individual actor
(b) is described by a so-called logic of selection describing
how the actor selects his actions based on the situation (or
his perception thereof). The logic of selection describes how
the actor makes his choice. Examples could be straightforward
normative action models in which the actor follows – like an
automaton – given rules according to predetermined norms or
more dynamic forms of action models including, for example,
cognitive learning.
The third step called aggregation logic comprises the micro-
sociological results and lifts them back onto the macro-level
to finally explain the social phenomenon that results.
The logic of explanation has been created in 1948 later
than Weber’s original [1] but it is possible to reconstruct his
original hypotheses using this logic. In his analysis of Weber’s
arguments McClelland [20] casually uses the macro-micro-
macro transition, when he reconstructs Weber’s explanation
of the relationship between ‘protestant ethic’ and ‘the spirit
of capitalism’. Protestantism has lead to changes in familial
socialization, a ‘familial revolution’ (macro to micro-level).
The change of educational style employed by protestant par-
ents (micro-level) has equipped their children with ‘strong
internalized achievement drives’. This has created the spirit
of capitalism back on the collective, the macro-level, and has
lead to the spread of a new type of actor, the entrepreneur.
A. Sociological Explanation of Insider Threats
In order to approach a tentative model of human behaviour
in HOL, we concentrate on our motivating application area of
insider threats. We illustrate how each of Weber’s three steps
can be supported.
As a running example, we consider first a more data-centric
view of insider attacks. Glasser and Lindauer [6] consider
the generation of insider threat data using a synthetic data
generation framework. The input to the data generation process
is largely autonomous and produces intelligent near realistic
data. However, the kernel ingredient to this process are basic
insider scenarios that are manually inserted. These insider
scenarios are constructed using counter-intelligence expert
knowledge.
We consider here an example from [6] that nicely shows all
three steps of the sociological process of explanation and that
thus suits us very well as a test case to elicit requirements to
a HOL model for human insider behaviour.
B. Insider Example: Dropbox
‘A member of a group decimated by layoffs suffers a drop in
job satisfaction. Angry at the company, the employee uploads
documents to Dropbox, planning to use them for personal
gain.’ The data generation process derives so-called ‘observ-
ables’ from this scenario. For the example, the observables are
given in the following list [6].
• Data streams end for laid-off co-workers, and they dis-
appear from the LDAP directory.
• As evidenced by logon and logoff times, subject becomes
less punctual because of a drop in job satisfaction.
• HTTP logs show document uploads by subject to Drop-
box.
When considering building a theory of human behaviour, we
can use this attack case since it shows the three steps of
Weber’s process and can thus serve for requirements elicitation
for a comprising HOL model [7]. The situational logic needs
to be able to model the process of (a) ‘A member of a group
decimated by layoffs suffers a drop in job satisfaction.’, the
logic of selection then must embed (b) ‘Angry at the company,
the employee uploads documents to Dropbox, planning to . . . ’,
and the aggregation logic should express (c) ‘use them for
personal gain’, i.e., effects on the society, for example, damage
to the company (workers and clients of company) and wider
economical effects.
The Dropbox example is a first illustration that social
explanation is a good method to analyse insider attacks. In the
following we aim at exploring whether this method is generally
applicable to the analysis of insider threats. To this end, we
look at more general patterns of insider threats derived from
real insider attack cases [4] and simultaneously at formalizing
the method of social explanation for the analysis of insider
threats in Isabelle/HOL.
IV. A HOL MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPLANATION OF
INSIDER THREATS
In this section, we first introduce the logical model of
actors, organisations, and policies formalized in Isabelle/HOL.
While doing so we refer to the three steps of Weber’s social
explanation motivating specific elements of the model. We
first briefly introduce Higher Order Logic, the logic that is
implemented in Isabelle/HOL introducing specific constructs
later on the fly when they are used.
A. Isabelle/HOL
Isabelle/HOL is an interactive proof assistant based on
Higher Order Logic (HOL). It enables specification of so-
called object-logics for an application. Object-logics comprise
new types, constants and definitions and reside in theory
files, e.g., the file Insider.thy contains the object-logic
we define for social explanation of insider threats below.
We construct our theory as a conservative extension of HOL
guaranteeing consistency. I.e., we do not introduce new axioms
that could lead to inconsistencies. As a support for this
conservative extension, new datatype and inductive definitions
can be defined by the user but their defining rules are derived
in the background by Isabelle. The introduction of a new
datatype automatically creates distinctiveness properties for its
constructors, a case analysis rule, and an induction principle
thus providing proof machinery for the application of the
derived theory. Isabelle/HOL also offers the concept of locales
[21] which supports modular reasoning [22]. Locales enable
local proof contexts in which syntactic abbreviations, arbitrary
but fixed variables, and assumed properties can be combined
and then invoked later in proofs.
The Isabelle/HOL model for social explanation of Insider
threats is contained in the theory Insider.thy. This theory
provides a framework for modeling and analysing insider
threats. As application case studies, we validate this framework
on two of the three main classes of insider threats [4]. The two
case studies are contained in EntitledIndependent.thy
and AmbitiousLeader.thy, respectively. These are available
online [23]. In the following, we introduce these three theories
in detail. A more detailed introduction into modeling in HOL
and comparison to social explanation is contained in [7].
B. Modeling Individuals and their Disposition
The transition from the macro-level to the micro-level
(step (a) in Figure 1) necessitates a macro-level view but
it is also determined by the insider’s mental characteristics,
e.g., psychological state and motivation to express how the
situation creates the individuals disposition and thus triggers
actions at the micro level. We first introduce the parts of
our Isabelle/HOL model for this situational logic introducing
actors and their psychological characteristics before we show
the model of the context, i.e., the network of actors and
locations that constitutes the macro-level.
Actors are modeled as an abstract type that is created via
a constructor function Actor from identities which are just a
synonym for the base type string.
typedecl actor
type_synonym identity = string
consts Actor :: string ⇒ actor
A recent framework for characterising insider threats [24]
offers a taxonomy of insider threats based on a thorough
survey on results from counterproductive workplace behaviour,
e.g., [25], [26] and case studies from the CMU-CERT Insider
Threat Guide [4]. The classes identified in this taxonomy are
the Precipitating Event or catalyst, the individual’s Personality
Characteristics, Historical Behaviour, Psychological State,
Attitude Towards Work, Skill Set, Opportunity, and Motivation
to Attack. We chose to use this taxonomy as it is based on a
considerable range of empirical research results and includes
those taxonomy parts of the CMU-CERT patterns that are
relevant for our psychological description of the disposition
of insiders.
It is simple to model a taxonomy in HOL since classes
are similar to types. We use here the concept of a HOL
datatype. As an example, consider the formal representation
of Psychological State as a datatype.
datatype psy_states = happy | depressed | disgruntled
| angry | stressed
The element on the right hand side are the five injective con-
structors of the new datatype psy_states. They are simple
constants, modeled as functions without arguments.
Another example is Motivation.
datatype motivations = financial | political | revenge
| fun | competitive_advantage
| power | peer_recognition
A practical issue is the integration of causalities, quantification
or qualification into this basic model. For example, if an
employee is disgruntled this might give rise to a motivation
of revenge. In [24], these causalities are expressed by drawing
lines between boxes containing the classes of the taxonomy.
These dependencies resemble the relation between variables
in the System Dynamics model (for an example, see Section
VI-B). Such lines express dependencies, like ‘motivation for
revenge may be caused by anger’ but this is not a logical
causality, i.e., anger⇒ revenge – a logical causality expresses
that anger necessarily implies revenge motivation which might
not be the case for all actors.
Logical implication is thus not adequate for expressing
dependencies between taxonomy classes. However, HOL of-
fers other constructs like sets, functions and relations that
extend the taxonomy classes with a finer grain for modeling
dependencies. The values identified for the different classes of
the insider threat taxonomy are distinct values by construction
since we defined them as the fields of a datatype. However,
they may occur in combination. This can be easily achieved
by building sets of criteria, like the following function that
uses the type constructors set to define a set of motivations.
motivation :: motivations set
This construct allows later to attach a range of motivating
values to an actor and consequently to use standard HOL-
set relations to compare these for qualitative statements, e.g.,
motivation_alice ⊆ motivation_bob to express that the
motivation to become an insider is higher for Bob. This
takes us one step further to a more qualitative model of the
insider taxonomy for (non-exclusive) insider criteria like mo-
tivation. However, for the psy_state datatype, combinations
of values, e.g., {happy, depressed} may be meaningless
and individualized relations like subtyping or inequalities are
more useful to introduce a more fine grained qualification and
dependencies. In order to add some quantification to each of
these factors, it is useful to explicitly model a quantity as part
of the assigning function for the actors. The quantity could
contain any metrics for a given insider characteristics, e.g.,
a real number denoting some measure for any of the actors
motivational values.
quant_motivation :: actor ⇒(real × motivation)
The Precipitating Event or Catalyst has a separate role in the
characteristics given in the taxonomy. It can be any event that
has the potential to tip the insider over the edge into becoming
a threat to their employer. It has been called the ‘tipping point’
in the literature and can be formalized as a predicate on actors.
In order to carry over to the micro-level representation, it is
advisable to contain with it the various characteristics about
the actor in a combined state.
datatype actor_state = State "motivation" "psy_state"
Finally, the catalyst is encoded as a tipping point predicate
that describes the motivation of an actor to become an insider.
definition tipping_point :: actor_state ⇒ bool
tipping_point a ≡ motivation a 6= {}
∧ happy 6= psy_states a
C. Modeling the Macro-Level and Behaviour
At the macro-level, we are interested in modeling the
actors including the insider within their context. Therefore,
we adopt an approach of modeling the organisation with
the actors as a network that can contain various layers of
physical, administrative and logical views inspired by Probst
and Hansen [27]. This approach originally uses the Klaim
calculus to model an organisation and its actors as a graph
of locations and actors. Figure 2 shows an example of a
physical model and its representation in ExASyM [28] used
as starting points in the TREsPASS project. This example
describes a company where the Janitor can access the printer
room becoming an insider by picking up confidential print-
outs. The organisation’s infrastructure (Figure 2, left) including
actors, networks, locations, and policies can be expressed as a
graph in ExASyM (Figure 2, right). This contextual model is a
graph containing actor identities, locations like rooms but also
logical locations like servers as its nodes. In our Isabelle/HOL
framework, we represent these graphs algebraically. Using a
polymorphic type variable ’n we define graphs over arbitrary
nodes, i.e., a graph can contain any type of nodes. We further
define a type node unifying identities and locations allowing
us to model infrastructure using a node graph (see below).
datatype location = Location nat
datatype node = NA identity | NL location
datatype ’n graph = Graph (’n × ’n)set
In order to explore insider behaviour in organisational models
(corresponding to step (b) in Figure 1), we use an abstract
view that is inspired by previous work on policy formalisations
and analysis [2], [5]. There, invalidation of policies reveals
insider attack vectors by modelchecking system and workflow
specifications.
In the current more refined Isabelle/HOL model we express
policies over actions get, move, eval, and put.
datatype action = get | move | eval | put
We abstract here from concrete data – actions have no param-
eters. Policies describe prerequisites for actions to be granted
to actors given by pairs of predicates (conditions) and sets of
(enabled) actions.
type_synonym policy = ((actor ⇒ bool) × action set)
We integrate policies with a graph into the infrastructure
providing an organisational model where policies reside at
locations and actors are adorned with additional predicates to
specify their ‘credentials’.
datatype infrastructure = Infrastructure
"node graph" "location ⇒ policy set" "actor ⇒ bool"
These local policies serve to provide a specification of the
‘normal’ behaviour of actors but are also the starting point
for possible attacks on the organisation’s assets. The enables
predicate specifies that an actor a can perform an action a’∈ e
at location l in the infrastructure I if a’s credentials (stored
in the tuple space tspace I a) imply the location policy’s
(stored in delta I l) condition p for a.
enables I l a a’ ≡
∃ (p,e) ∈ delta I l. a’ ∈ e ∧ (tspace I a −→ p(a))
The behaviour abstractly specifies that good actors respect the
global policy.
behaviour I ≡ {(t,a,a’). enables I t a a’}
Attacks can be found efficiently by invalidating a global policy
and then analysing whether the local policies enable the actors
to achieve a state violating this policy. This analysis is the
aggregation logic of the three steps of social explanation. It
leads back to the macro level (step (c) in Figure 1) thus
connecting macro and micro level to show how an insider
attack can be performed.
D. Connecting Macro and Micro Level: Insiderness
Analysis of protocol verification, like the classical
Needham-Schroeder public key attack and other insider threat
case studies [2] show that a recurring scheme in insider attacks
lies in role identification as described in Section II. We define
this role identification by the UasI predicate. It expresses that
the insider plays a loyal member of an organisation while he
simultaneously acts as an outside attacker.
UasI a b ≡ (Actor a = Actor b)
Insider attacks link the micro level insider characterization
of psychological disposition with the above insider behaviour
UasI. This is defined by the following rule Insider a C
for the attacker a. The parameter C is a set of identities
representing the members of an organisation. For the analysis
of insider attacks that span over more than one company
(see the Insider pattern “Ambitious Leader” in Section V-C)
it is necessary to consider different organisations and their
employees.
Insider a C ≡
tipping_point (astate a) −→ (∀ b ∈ C. UasI a b)
Although we characterize the above as a rule, it is not
axiomatised; it is just a definition. We will use it as a local
assumption (using the assumes feature of locales) in our case
studies.
V. APPLYING THE ISABELLE/HOL MODEL TO CASE
STUDIES
Finally, we illustrate the model and our methodology on
case studies. We model the two insider threat patterns of
Entitled Independent and Ambitious Leader in Isabelle/HOL
showing how the three steps of social explanation are applied.
A. Insider Threat Patterns
The CERT Guide to Insider Threats [4] provides a ‘break-
down of insider threats into three types of crimes: fraud,
theft of Intellectual Property, and sabotage. [. . . ] Insider IT
sabotage crimes are those in which an insider uses IT to
direct specific harm at an organisation or an individual. [. . . ]
Insider fraud cases are those in which an insider uses IT
for the unauthorized modification, addition, or deletion of an
organisation’s data (not programs or systems) for personal
gain, or theft of information which leads to an identity crime.
[. . . ] Insider theft of Intellectual Property [is] an insider’s use
of IT to steal intellectual property from the organisation.’
To show that our Isabelle/HOL model can serve as a general
concept for the explanation of insider threats we use these
patterns as benchmarks formalizing them in the framework
introduced in the previous Section. Out of the three possible
patterns of insider threat, we concentrate on insider theft of
Intellectual Property. This pattern actually consists of two
models [4]:
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Fig. 2. A simple example system and its representation as a graph including actors, networks, locations, and policies in ExASyM [28]. In our Isabelle/HOL
framework, we represent these graphs algebraically.
• Entitled Independent: ‘an insider acting primarily alone
to steal information to take to a new job or to his own
side business’,
• Ambitious Leader: ‘a leader of an insider crime who
recruits insiders to steal information for some larger
purpose.’
We do neither consider the patterns for fraud nor sabotage
in this paper but we believe our framework to be capable
of dealing with those equally well (see also Section VI
for a discussion of that question). We do not follow the
System Dynamics taxonomy given in the MERIT model but
instead replace it by the similar taxonomy [24] formalized in
Section IV-B since it subsumes the parts concerning the human
disposition that are relevant for us.
B. Entitled Independent
The third step of social explanation leads the results of
the actions of the individual actor at the micro level back to
the macro level to explain the sociological phenomenon. In
the insider threat patterns, this third step requires expressing
the phenomenon: the insider breaks the organisation’s policy.
Therefore, we first need to define the global policy based
on the local ones. Since the main effect is that of violating
the global corporate policy, the effect to the macro-level is
subsumed by the negated global policy: the attack of the
insider has the effect that corporate data reaches the outside
of the corporate network. Thus, the explanation consists of a
proof in Isabelle/HOL that the insider can break the policy,
i.e., the policy does not hold for him/her.
We give here a step by step description of the main analysis
of the Entitled Independent case study. The full code is con-
tained in the theory EntitledIndependent.thy available on
the web at [23].
The case study uses our framework whose main module
is the general theory for insiders in Insider.thy. Existing
Isabelle/HOL theories can be imported to other theories.
Here, we import Insider. To enable local definitions of a
scenario for the Entitled Independent allowing the additional
assumption of the necessary insiderness rules, we use the
concept of locales and define locale scenarioEI.
theory EntitledIndependent
imports Insider
begin
locale scenarioEI =
We only model two identities, Charly_comp and
Charly_priv representing actor Charly once as a member
of the company and once as an outsider. We define the
set of company actors as a local definition in the locale
scenarioEI. We show here in a first instance the full
Isabelle/HOL syntax but in all subsequent definitions we omit
the fixes and defines keywords and also drop the types
for clarity of the exposition. The full formalisation can be
downloaded [23]. The double quotes ’’s’’ create a string
in Isabelle/HOL.
fixes company_actors :: identity set
defines company_actors_def:
company_actors ≡ {’’Charly_comp’’}
The graph representing the infrastructure of the Entitled Inde-
pendent case study contains only the minimal structure.
company_locations ≡ {Location 1}
A global policy could be ‘no corporate data must leave the
corporate network’ formalized in our HOL model using the
enables statement (see previous Section) as follows.
global_policy I a ≡ a /∈ company_actors −→
¬(∃ t. t ∈ company_locations. enables I t a get)
Next, we have to provide the definition of the infrastructure.
We first define the graph representing the organisation’s loca-
tions and the positions of its actors. Locations are wrapped
up with the datatype constructor NL and actors using the
corresponding constructor NA to enable joining them in the
datatype node and thus creating the following node graph
as a set of pairs between locations or actors.
ex_graph ≡
Graph {(NA (’’Charly_comp’’), NL (Location 1)),
(NL (Location 2), NL (Location 1)),
(NA (’’Charly_priv’’), NL (Location 2))}
Policies are attached to locations in the organisation’s graph
using a function that maps each location to the set of the
policies valid in this location. The policies are again pairs.
The first element of these pairs are credentials which are
defined as predicates over actors, i.e., boolean valued functions
describing, for example, whether an actor inhabits a role, or,
whether an actor possesses something, like an identity or a key.
The second elements are sets of actions that are authorised in
this location for actors authenticated by the credentials.
local_policies ≡
(λ x. if x = Location 1 then
{(λ x. role (x, ’’employee’’), {get,put})}
else (if x = Location 2 then
{((λ x. (ID x ’’Charly_comp’’) ∨
(ID x ’’Charly_priv’’)),
{get,put})}
else {}))
For the final component of the infrastructure (the credentials
in the tspace) we define the assignment of the credentials to
the actors similarly as a predicate over actors that is true for
actors that have the credentials.
ex_creds ≡ (λ x. if x = Actor ’’Charly_comp’’ then
role (x,’’employee’’)
else False)
Finally, we can put the graph, the local policies, and the
credential assignment into an infrastructure.
EntInd_scenario ≡
Infrastructure ex_graph local_policies ex_creds
Note, that all the above definitions have been implemented
as local definitions using the locale keywords fixes and
defines. Thus they are accessible whenever the locales
scenarioEI is invoked but are not axioms that could endanger
consistency. We now also make use of the possibility of locales
to define local assumptions. This is very suitable in this context
since we want to emphasize that the following formulas are not
general facts or axiomatic rules but are assumptions we make
in order to explore the validity of the infrastructure’s global
policy. The first assumption provides that the precipitating
event has occurred which leads to the second assumption that
provides that Charly can act as an insider.
assumes Charly_precipitating_event:
tipping_point (astate ’’Charly_comp’’)
assumes Insider_Charly :
Insider ’’Charly_comp’’ {’’Charly_priv’’}
So far, we have specified the model. Based on these definitions
and assumptions we can now state theorems about the security
of the model and interactively prove them in our Isabelle/HOL
framework. We can now first prove a sanity check on the
model by validating the infrastructure for the “normal” case.
For Charly as a company actor, everything is fine: the global
policy does hold. The following is the statement of the
Isabelle/HOL theorem ex_inv followed by the proof script of
its interactive proof. The proof is achieved by locally unfolding
the definitions of the scenario, e.g., EntInd_scenario_def
and applying the simplifier.
lemma ex_inv:
global_policy EntInd_scenario (’’Charly_comp’’)
by (simp add: EntInd_scenario_def global_policy_def
company_actors_def)
However, since Charly_comp is at tipping point, he will
ignore the global policy. This insider threat of the Entitled
Independent can now be formalised as an invalidation of the
global company policy for ’’Charly_priv’’in the following
“attack” theorem named ex_inv1.
theorem ex_inv1:
¬ global_policy EntInd_scenario ’’Charly_priv’’
The proof of this theorem consists of a few simple steps
largely supported by automated tactics. As in the previous
lemma, we first unfold the definitions leading to two subgoals
in the interactive process of proving the theorem ex_inv1 in
Isabelle/HOL.
1. ’’Charly_priv’’ /∈ company_actors
2. ∃ t ∈ company_locations.
enables
(Infrastructure ex_graph local_policies ex_creds)
t (Actor ’’Charly_priv’’) get
The first subgoal is solved by simplifying with the definition of
company_actors. The difficult case is the second one since
’’Charly_priv’’ is not enabled to execute a get action on
a company location. However, here the locale assumptions
Charly_precipitating_event and Charly_Insider im-
ply that
∀ b ∈ company_actors. UasI ’’Charly_comp’’ b
Hence, we can instantiate the universally quantified
b with ’’Charly_priv’’ and derive that Actor
’’Charly_comp’’ and Actor ’’Charly_priv’’ are
the same actor. Substituting now Actor ’’Charly_priv’’
by Actor ’’Charly_comp’’ in 2. solves the second
remaining subgoal and proves the goal. Summarizing,
Charly_priv can get access to company data. This solves
subgoal 2. and thus finishes the proof of the theorem
ex_inv1 in our Isabelle/HOL framework for insider threats.
Results: The attack is proved above as an Isabelle/HOL
theorem. Applying logical analysis, we thus exhibit that under
the given assumptions the organisation’s model is vulnerable to
an insider. This overall procedure corresponds to the approach
of invalidation of a global policy based on local policies
for a given application scenario [5]. This earlier work on
invalidation uses verification with modelchecking. The current
approach using interactive theorem proving with Isabelle/HOL
requires user interaction to exhibit the attack but there are
advantages. First, we have no restriction on the complexity
of the model; there is no risk of a state explosion as in
modelchecking. We can explicitly express and reason about
properties of all elements of our model. We already exploit
this in the definition of the actors’ state and the insider
predicates in our insider theory that is then applied in the
Entitled Independent analysis. Further extending this, we can
use the higher expressiveness of HOL to elaborate the model
to increase its resilience against insider attacks. A possible
remedy, and thus a useful iteration in a practical application
of our framework in designing or re-engineering a security
architecture, would be to forbid sharing of Actor roles. In
the following more complex insider threat pattern of the
Ambitious Leader, this remedy is applied.
C. Ambitious Leader
The Ambitious Leader resembles the Entitled Independent.
At least at the level of the taxonomy describing the mental
disposition of the actors, i.e., the model of the micro level,
we can reuse the same insider theory. The aspect that is
more challenging in the Ambitious Leader pattern is the
different setup of the infrastructure at the macro level. This
pattern generalizes the Entitled Independent in that it is a
combined attack between two organisations. The insider attack
is only successful because the attacker can control two sub-
insiders in two different companies. Here we have to extend
the insider theory by a more refined insider predicate. The
Ambitious Leader Mallory should be able to impersonate
two sub-insiders Charly and Carol in two different organi-
sations while these two cannot impersonate each other. How-
ever, with the previous insider predicate, Insider Mallory
{’’Charly’’, ’’Carol’’} we would be able to prove that
Actor ’’Charly’’ = Actor ’’Carol’’ since the defini-
tion of UasI provides two equalities.
Actor ’’Mallory’’ = Actor ’’Charly’’
Actor ’’Mallory’’ = Actor ’’Carol’’
Since equality in HOL is an equivalence relation, i.e., reflexive,
symmetric, and transitive, we immediately get that Charly
and Carol can impersonate each other contradicting the
assumptions of the Ambitious Leader scenario. Therefore, we
introduce here a less general insider predicate Insider’
Insider’ P a C ≡
(tipping_point (astate a) −→
(∀ b∈ C. UasI’ P a b ∧ inj_on Actor C))
This predicate demands that the function Actor must be
injective on the set C which means that two Actors cannot
share an identity if they are from the set C, i.e., the same
company. In addition, we also use here a refined predicate
UasI’ that does not allow full equality of the Actors but
only substitution in one direction in arbitrary contexts P. This
variable P is a Higher Order function over the type actor.
UasI’ P a b ≡ P (Actor b) −→ P (Actor a)
For illustration purposes, we keep the infrastructure model
for the Ambitious Leader as small as possible while still
expressing two organisations with the two sub-insiders Charly
and Carol which are placed in two different locations corre-
sponding to the two different organisations.
locale ambitious_leader =
company_one_actors ≡ {’’Charly’’}
company_two_actors ≡ {’’Carol’’}
company_one_locations ≡ {Location 1}
company_two_locations ≡ {Location 2}
The Ambitious Leader is represented by the third actor
Mallory that is not a member of any of the two organisations.
The global policy differs substantially in that it now reflects
that actors that are not members of both organisations should
not be enabled by the policies to get anything from the other
company’s locations.
global_policy I a ≡
¬(a ∈ company_one_actors ∨ a ∈ company_two_actors)
−→ ¬((∃ t ∈ company_one_locations.
enables I t (Actor a) get)
∧(∃ t ∈ company_two_locations.
enables I t (Actor a) get))
The infrastructure graph contains the two organisations, their
actors and also an “outside” location, Location 3 where the
Ambitious Leader Mallory is positioned (see Figure 3).
ex_graph ≡
Graph {(NA (’’Charly’’), NL (Location 1)),
(NL (Location 3), NL (Location 1)),
(NA (’’Mallory’’), NL (Location 3)),
(NL (Location 3), NL (Location 2)),
(NA (’’Carol’’), NL (Location 2))}
The local policies assigned to the companies’ nodes implement
that only employees of the corresponding organisations should
have access.
local_policies ≡ (λ x. if x ≡ Location 1 then
{(λ x. role (x, ’’employee_C_one’’), {get,put})}
else (if x = Location 2 then
{((λ x. role(x, ’’employee_C_two’’)), {get,put})}
else {}))
The credentials assign the right roles to the employees Charly
as being with the first company and Carol with the second.
ex_creds ≡ (λ x. if x = Actor ’’Charly’’ then
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Fig. 3. Graphical representation of ambitious leader in ExASyM.
role (x,’’employee_C_one’’)
else
(if x = Actor ’’Carol’’ then
role (x,’’employee_C_two’’) else False))
As in the previous case study, we can then combine these
elements into the infrastructure depicted in Figure 3.
amb_lead_scenario ≡
Infrastructure ex_graph local_policies ex_creds
We can prove again as a sanity check that the global policy
holds for each of the companies in isolation, i.e., the follow-
ing two propositions are proved as theorems in the theory
AmbitiousLeader.thy
global_policy amb_lead_scenario (’’Charly’’)
global_policy amb_lead_scenario (’’Carol’’)
Nevertheless, the ambitious leader Mallory can attack. We
can prove the following “attack” theorem ex_inv2 in our
Isabelle/HOL framework.
theorem ex_inv2:
¬ global_policy amb_lead_scenario (’’Mallory’’)
The locale assumptions that enable this proof are the follow-
ing. Note, that we use here the refined insider characterisation
Insider’ introduced above.
assumes Mallory_precipitating_event:
tipping_point (astate ’’Mallory’’)
assumes Insider_Mallory:
Insider’ (λ x. enables I t x a’)
’’Mallory’’ {’’Charly’’, ’’Carol’’}
The proof of this final theorem ex_inv2 is slightly more
complicated than in the previous case study of the Entitled
Independent since we have to combine two insider attacks.
Therefore, we have to show that Mallory can impersonate
Charly in the first company and Carol in the second to break
the global policy twice and use action get at the two locations.
Results: While the basic structure of the human disposition
is the same for the Entitled Independent and the Ambitious
Leader there are some decisive differences in the applications
to the two case studies. Besides the different organisational
scenarios that lead to different attacks, the impersonation
given by the extended predicate UasI’ is more subtle. An
important point that is nicely illustrated by this refinement of
the impersonation predicate is that the explicit modeling of the
actors and their identities enables a precise expression of what
corresponds to authenticity: if the relationship between the
identity and the actor that manifests this identity is an injective
function then we implicitly formalize proof of identity. The
expression of and reasoning about properties of functions, like
injectivity of Actor, that are used in the model, is clearly
a higher order feature not possible in first order logics or
modal logics of model checkers. In general, reasoning at the
macro level when using properties of the infrastructure while
at the same time being able to reason at both macro and micro
level enables also reasoning about the dispositions of actors
in relation to the infrastructure context. This is necessary to
formalize the macro-micro transitions of social explanation.
For example, we can express in the insider theory the level
of connectedness of actors in the social graph and its effects
on the tipping point of an actor. It is important to see that
this goes beyond what the propositional and modal logics of
model checkers offer and thus shows the benefits of the HOL
approach.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Own Previous Work
In own previous work [2], [5], we have used invalidation of
security policies and subsequent modelchecking to discover
possible insider attacks. In this earlier approach we already
used organisational models similar to the ones presented here
and expressed policies as propositional or temporal properties
on these models. However, the organisational models had to
be simplistic in nature to avoid the state explosion problem
that is inherent in the modelchecking approach. On the other
hand, we already noticed in these early experiments that a
refinement of these simple models is often a very useful step
to exhibit sufficient detail to discover an insider attack. For
example, a date had to be added to a lottery ticket to make
the backdating scam detectable [2]. However, it is exactly
this kind of state variable that causes complex state spaces
and impedes the modelchecking analysis. We thus already
integrated Isabelle/HOL in these earlier experiments to verify
refinement conditions between abstract and refined models.
In the current work, we show that the verification of insider
threats can be completely performed inside Isabelle/HOL.
Compared to modelchecking, we need to perform proofs of
policy violations interactively but the proofs are largely done
by automated simplification in Isabelle/HOL. We extended the
HOL model for insider threats [7] to cope with general insider
threat patterns and validated this on the two general patterns
Entitled Independent and Ambitious Leader.
B. Other Works
The CERT Guide to Insider threats [4] uses the System
Dynamics modeling method. In this methodology abstract
variables define a taxonomy of insider threat cases. Graphi-
cally, these variables are presented in square boxes. A solid
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Fig. 4. The expectation escalation in the Systems Dynamics model for the
IT sabotage insider threat pattern – another one of three [4, page 32].
arrow from a box containing variable a to one containing
variable b indicates that an increase of a implies an increase of
b. A dashed arrow represents the inverse relationship, i.e., that
an increase of a corresponds to a decrease of b. In comparison
to our way of modeling and analysing insider threats in HOL,
this approach enables expression of a relationship between
variables. However, this is an imprecise, i.e., not quantified
dependency. Moreover, the modeling is constrained to the
shallow expression of variables of a taxonomy and has no
structure to model the various levels and structures we have
in our HOL framework. Figure 4 shows a part of the pattern for
IT sabotage, another one of the three main patterns of Insider
Threat from the CERT guide [4]. The part shown concerns
the modeling of the insider’s disposition. It is very similar to
the taxonomy we chose [24] as a basis for our Isabelle/HOL
framework further supporting the generality of our approach.
The inductive approach to security protocol verification in
Isabelle by Paulson [29], the designer of the Isabelle system,
picked up on the hype generated by the earlier modelcheck-
ing approach to security by Lowe [30]. This approach is
already sufficient to model the Lowe attack but it is not
yet sufficiently expressive for insider threats. In comparison
to modelchecking, the inductive approach is more laborious
as it requires human interaction, but it is unrivaled in its
expressiveness which allows proofs beyond the ones that are
usually done in model checkers. The model chosen in the
inductive approach can be seen as a micro-level representation
of a global communication scenario. Social explanation is
not explicitly addressed nor is any relation to sociology
intended. The security protocol defines the ‘normal’ behaviour
of communication partners and the Dolev-Yao model [31]
characterizes the attacker’s behaviour (sees all, can intercept,
and send). The first step of situational logic (interpretation)
is implicit in the inductive approach since the attacker has
been already introduced. An explicit modeling of this first step
needs to integrate a description of how a ‘normal’ principal
turns into an attacker. This is what is additionally addressed
in the social explanation approach by the transition from the
macro to the micro level. It is arguable whether the proofs
of secrecy of keys in the inductive approach can be seen
as the third step of micro to macro transition of the social
explanation.
The application of HOL for human behavior modeling has
been pioneered by Bella and Coles-Kemp in their formal
consideration of ceremonies [32]. This concept expands a
security protocol to include all those assumptions and other
context information that was previously considered as ‘out-of
band’. Thus, like in our approach, a ceremony also considers
the human factor as a central element. The main emphasis
in ceremonies, and consequently also in Bella’s and Coles-
Kemp’s work, is on incomplete or partial behaviour of humans,
for example, incomplete comparison of values. Bella and
Coles-Kemp propose a ‘multiple-layer model’ consisting of a
stack of protocols. The lower part contains the technological
protocol layers and the upper part the sociological layers.
There is one unique interface (Layer III) where the socio-
technological interaction is modeled and analyzed by state
descriptions (‘stances’) in one direction: from the user to
the computer interface. For insider attacks a more complete
representation of actors, their internal state as well as their
physical and organisational context is needed. Therefore, we
model individual actors, their mental state, actions as well as
locations that can be physical or logical entities.
Formal techniques for insider analysis have also been ap-
plied by Pieters, Dimkov, and Pavlovic [33]. They consider
policy alignment to address different levels of abstraction of
socio-technical systems. Policy alignment is in their view a
refinement of policies to more concrete system representations.
Policies are interpreted as first-order logical theories contain-
ing all sequences of actions (the behaviours) and expressing
the policy as a ‘distinguished’ prefix-closed predicate in these
theories. Refinement of consistent, i.e., policy-fulfilling speci-
fications, is then readily provided by the completeness relation
between first-order theories. Although the use of graphs as
system representations and local policies attached to those
graphs is used in the application example, contrary to our
approach Pieters et al. do not use an explicit infrastructure
model in their approach [33] but only an abstract formal notion
of action sequences to represent systems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we showed that Isabelle/HOL is suited to
model insider threats based on the process of social explana-
tion. We derived a characterization of an insider’s capability
to impersonate others from protocol verification. The use of
Higher Order Logic permits the expression of the actor’s
mental disposition like motivation or psychological state. At
the same time in a same theory, the infrastructure of an organ-
isation including the physical network, logical policies and an
abstract behaviour of actors in this network can be represented.
Thus, human behaviour can be modeled for insider threats
according to Weber’s three steps of sociological explanation.
Higher Order Logic allows formalisation of actors’ properties
for all three steps as we illustrated on the two general insider
patterns of Entitled Independent and Ambitious Leader. This
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Fig. 5. Using multiple biosensors, each tailored to identify a specific
bio marker, we propose a security architecture for cyber physical systems
including humans that can be used in the home to provide objective data of
the progression and possible causes of Alzheimer’s disease. Step ISA shows
where the Isabelle/HOL framework for social explanation is used to extract
a secure infrastructure model and policies that can be fed into a development
cycle for the architecture as use cases including insider attackers as actors.
illustration implicitly validates that insider attacks in general
can be explained using social explanation. The model of
the human disposition is very similar in one of the other
two patterns (see Figure 4) strengthening this conjecture.
There are many works on modeling human behaviour in
psychology, sociology, and also human computer interaction.
We have picked the approach of social explanation since it
fits best our purpose of providing a logical framework for
insider threat analysis. A detailed introduction to modeling
and theory building in Higher Order Logic [7] compares
it to the three step process of sociology. The process of
construction of theories in HOL corresponds largely to the
logic of explanation [19] underpinning social explanation (see
Section III). We thus use HOL modeling here to analyse local
policies within infrastructures in relation to global policies and
their vulnerability to insiders threats.
The demonstration of social explanation contributes to the
understanding of insider threats in complex infrastructures and
also provides a framework for their modeling and analysis.
This framework is an extension of the Isabelle/HOL proof
assistant thus providing a dedicated tool for modeling concrete
infrastructures of organisations and their security policies.
Interactive proof with our Isabelle/HOL extension then allows
proving violations of global policies by actions of malicious
insiders. Detection of such violations can be used to improve
the infrastructure and policies leading to an improved security
architecture. Figure 5 shows how we envisage the integration
of our framework for a privacy enhancing sensor network for
the monitoring of dementia patients.
Interactive theorem proving in Isabelle/HOL shows yet
again how expressive and thus powerful it is: human psy-
chological dispositions, local and global policies, as well as
physical and network aspects of organisation’s infrastructures
can be expressed in HOL. The price to pay for expressiveness
is human interaction in proofs but at a high level of system
development – like security architectures – human interaction
seems natural. Beyond this application of the formalisation of
social explanation to insider threats, we consider it worthwhile
to explore our approach further also on the conceptual level
and continue the elaboration of a general model of social
explanation in Isabelle/HOL. The current work has provided
a theory for the description of insiders at the macro and
micro level as well as methods for the rigorous support
of social explanation: the Insider predicate allows to link
macro and micro level and the use of locales in Isabelle/HOL
supports clear structuring of local insider assumptions for the
verification of case studies. It is interesting to explore to what
extent an independent theory of Weber’s three steps can be
formalized in Isabelle/HOL and meta-theoretic theorems can
be proved. Such a theory would be beneficial to approach
a systematic methodology for social explanation of cyber-
humane systems even beyond insider threats.
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